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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant
for damages for injuries received by the plaintiff-appellant and the damages resulting therefrom, on the 16th
day of September, 1963, at approximately 9:15 in the
morning, when the plaintiff-appellant tripped over obstructions in what is sometimes called the parking area,
between the curb and the sidewalk proper, in Kanab,
Kane County, Utah. The defendant, Kanab City, Utah,
a Municipal Corporation, was the municipality involved;
lhe defendants LaMar Bybee and Carvel Mattsson, as
Administrator of the estate of Odell Watson, deceased
were the owners of the property in front of which said
obstructions were located, and California-Pacific Utilities Company, a Corporation, the other defendant, was
a tenant of the same property, and was an exclusive
tenant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in Kanab, Kane
County, Utah, commencing 4 May, 1966, and running
until the 5th day of May, 1966. At the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case, and in response to motions by each of
the defendants for dismissal for failure to prove a primafacie cause of action, these motions were verbally
granted, under provisions of Rule 41-B, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, upon the ground that on the facts presented by the plaintiff and the law applicable thereto,
plaintiff had shown no right to relief as against any of
the defendants. A written judgment of dismissal, dated
the 10th day of May, 1966, was entered by the Clerk of
the Court on the 16th day of May, 1966. A motion for a
new trial was filed, and argued on the 2nd day of August, 1966. Although no written order was entered on that
date, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District Judge,
announced that he was overruling and denying the motion for a new trial. Thereafter, this matter has come
to an appeal on the appeal of the plaintiff and appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of dismissal and of the order overruling and denying the motion for a new trial, and desires that the Su·
preme Court order the matter to be remanded and tried
before a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and appellant believes that the facts
are as follows: That prior to the 16th day of September,
1963, the plaintiff-appellant was steadily employed as a
cook in the Trail's End Cafe, in Kanab, Kane County,
Utah, and was making $12.00 a day. That on the 16th
day of September, 1963, at approximately 9:15 in the
morning, the plaintiff, accompanied by a daughter, a
grandchild, and a son, in a vehicle driven by the son,
went to the Kanab Branch of the First State Bank of
Salina. That this bank is housed in a building adjacent
to the property in question, being east of the property
in question. That there was an alley between the build·
ing in which California-Pacific Utilities Company was
housed, being the property in question, and the Kanab
Branch of the First State Bank of Salina, and this prop·
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ty was owned by the defendants LaMar Bybee and Carvel Mattsson, the Administrator of the Estate of Odell
Watson, deceased, which gave the exclusive possession
of the property owned by the defendants LaMar Bybee
and Carvel Mattsson, Administratior of the Estate of
Odell Watson, deceased, to California-Pacific Utilities
Company, and placed on California-Pacific Utilities Company a duty of care and maintenance of the area on
which said building was located. In approaching the
bank, the son of the plaintiff drove down the street going
from East to West, the bank being located on the north
side of the street, and parked the vehicle in which the
plaintiff and her companions were riding directly in
front of the California-Pacific Utilities Company offices
which are in the building on the property in question
and in Kanab, Utah. The son of the plaintiff parked the
vehicle parallel, and within an inch or two of the curb.
The plaintiff, in approaching this area, was riding in the
right front seat of the vehicle. Her son was driving. Her
daughter and the grandchild were in the rear seat. The
vehicle was a station wagon. LaMar Bybee and Odell
Watson, now deceased, had purchased this property
several years prior thereto, in approximately 1957, and
at the time of their purchase, there was a canopy extending over the sidewalk to the curb, that had been
used to house a service station. The uprights were adjacent to the street, and rested upon two cement blocks
which extended above the curbing approximately six
inches, and said blocks were approximately 18 inches
in each direction. The vehicle stopped approximately
between the two blocks. At the time of the trial, said
blocks had been removed by the defendant Lamar Bybee.
In relation to the curb there was the customary four to
six-inch lip on the curb, and the blocks were against this
cement lip of the curb, and north thereof, toward the
building. There had also been a water pipe that came
up immediately adjacent to the east side of the east
block in approximately the center thereof, and after
Purchasing said building, the defendant LaMar Bybee,
and Odell Watson, now deceased, removed the canopy
for Lhcir purposes and left the blocks. The water pipe
1\ as cut off approximately
the height of the blocks,
or slightly lower. On the 16th of September, 1963, at the
time of the injury, these blocks and water pipe were in
this condition and had been there for several years.
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The plaintiff left the automobile by the right front door
turned and shut the door, and stepped toward the bani~
in a diagonal direction, and stumbled and fell, and became unconscious, and the injuries resulted. After the
accident, plaintiff determined she had fallen over the
east of said blocks, or the water pipe in connection therewith, and did not at the time of the accident have any
idea what she had fallen over. Permanent injuries and
damage have resulted and there are considerable doctor
bills and loss of wages, in addition to pain and suffering.
Within thirty days of this accident, a damage claim
was duly submitted to Kanab City in accordance with
Title 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, same being
dated 3 October, 1963 In addition attempts were made
to serve same on Mr. Bybee, and eventually he was
served, although not within any 30-day period. On Oc·
tober 22, 1963, a special meeting of Kanab City Council
was held, at which the notice that was later served up·
on the plaintiff, stated that notice was given and that
a quorum was present. The notice dated 24 October, 1963,
stated that at said meeting the claim of Margaret Mc·
Allister date October 3, 1963, was rejected on the grounds
that Kanab City was not negligent; that any injuries
that were received by the plaintiff were the sole and
exclusive result of the negligence of the plaintiff and
that without admitting negligence on the part of
Kanab City, if any such negligence could be found, the
contributary negligence of the plaintiff precluded her
recovery.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS OWED A DUTY TO
MAKE PREMISES SAFE TO PLAINTIFF AND
OTHER PEOPLE CROSSING SAID AREA.
It goes without saying that Kanab City owes a duty
to all people to keep its streets and sidewalks free from
unsafe, dangerous, defective and obstructive conditions.
Authority fo1· this statement starts with Utah Code An·
notated 195:3 in Section 10-8-8, giving the city authori1~
to lay 01tt, f_'stablbh, open, alter, widen, narrow, extend,
grade, pnve, or ot!'len\'i~~e improve streets, alleys, av~
nuPs. 1Joi.Ju 01rds, sicle\\ alks, parks, airports, pub!IC
grouncb, and irLlY vacate the sa11•c 01· any parts by ordi1
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nance, and is extended in Section 10-8-11 I Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, pertaining to streets, encroachments,
lighting, sprinkling and cleaning:
"They may regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks, and public
grounds prevent and remove obstructions and encroachments thereon, provide for the lighting,
sprinkling and cleaning of same."
This is a question of a duty of a city to its citizens
or any other persons to make the streets safe and remove obstructions. There is a long history of cases and
judgments against cities in the state of Utah. There is
a comprehensive discussion of liability of a city to remove obstructions and to keep its streets free from unsafe, dangerous, defective or obstructive conditions, in
the case of Niblick vs. Salt Lake City, 111 P. 2d 800, 100
Utah 573. While this particular case held that the statute did not pertain to negligence of its employees in
driving vehicles and items of that nature, there is a tremendous amount of authority quoted pertaining to obstructions and negligence in keeping this condition from
coming into existence. This case cites the two statutes
cited above, and in addition the statute requiring a
claim to be presented, as being the basis of cities' liability in cases of this nature. In this case, the case of
Alder vs. Salt Lake City is cited, 231 P. 1103, 64 Utah 568.
"There is a well-recognized exception to the general rule of immunity in cases involving the maintenance of care of public streets, and it is generally held
that municipalities are liable for negligence in failing
to keep the avenues of public travel in safe condition
and repair. It is argued that a similar exception should
be made in the case of the maintenance of public
parks, playgrounds, etc. The exception in the case of
streets is founder upon public policy and expediency,
and is recognized in this state by legislative act."
The case of Niblock vs. Salt Lake City, cited above,
then goes on to a considerably comprehensive discussion
by the Utah State Supreme Court setting forth the duties of a city in keeping its public ways clear, and cites
a great many other cases as authority, including, but
not limited to Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93
P. 570, Morris vs. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 373, 35 Utah 474,
and no end of cases from other jurisdictions.
Next comes the question as to whether or not the
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duty of a city to keep a street free from obstructions extends to the area between the curb and the sidewalk
which is often referred to as the parking, in which th~
cement blocks and the pipe referred to above were located. The inclusion of this area has been very definitely defined as part of the city's liability in the case of
Hunt vs. Tooele City, 334 P. 2d 555, 8 Utah 2d 323. In
this instance, a judgment for damages was sustained
by the Utah State Supreme Court against Tooele City
for injuries received in stumbling on a slight break in
a curbing, where there was an unusual defect and rise
between the curbing and the parking area. In this particular case, as to the liability of the city for negligence
of leaving an item of this nature, Utah State Supreme
Court quotes Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which has been cited above, and in addition quotes the
Niblick vs. Salt Lake City cited above; also the case of
Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, 159 P. 2d, 149, 108 Utah
266, and in quoting the case of Bills vs. Salt Lake City,
109, P. 745, 37 Utah 507, makes the following statement:
"A person using a public street has no reason to
apprehend danger, and is not required to be vigilent,
to discover dangerous obstructions, but he may walk
or drive in the daytime or nighttime, relying on the
assumption that the corporation whose duty it is to
keep the streets in a safe condition for travel have
performed that duty, and that he is exposed to no
danger from its neglect."
And in relation to a contributory negligence question
arises makes the following statement:
"What is meant is that he needs exercise ordinary care only to detect and avoid obstructions or defects that are obvious, and that may and ought to be
detected, and hence avoided by the exercise of ordinary care .... ''
Consideration of the Hunt Vs. Tooele City case very def·
initely should deter one from any thought that the park·
ing is not included in the streets, and that the duty of the
city does not cover the parking as well as the sidewalk
and the street proper.
Pertaining to the landowner and the tenants, there
is no question as to their liability for maintaining a haz·
ard of tlli:; nature. In the first place, this hazard was
created by the affirmative act of the landowner, as set
forth in the testimony of Mr. Bybee, beginning on Page
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"13 of the transcript on Line 19, and running to Page
l ±l:i, Line 18. This testimony through this portion shows
LJ1at at the time the alterations were made and the canr,py was taken down, Bybee and Watson owned the
building and California-Pacific Utilities Company was
in possession of it, under a 10-year lease from 1959 to
1DG9, the lease having been entered in evidence as exhibit 7, and the taking it down was paid for by Watson
ai1J Bybee, was requested by the City and the State
noad Commission in making street alterations, and that
tne premises were under a lease requiring the tenant
to take care of the area. When a trap of this nature was
created at that time under a lease agreement in existenl'.e at that point, there is no question that all three
defendants were participants in and parties to creating
the trap that caused the damage to the plaintiff. In addition, the Revised Ordinances of the City of Kanab,
l!Y59, adopted by the City Council of Kanab, Utah, on
the Sth day of September, 1959, which were in effect in
1%:\ at the time of the injury, contains the following
paragraph:
"18-1. Obstruction of Sidewalks. It shall be unlawful for any person owning, occupying or having
control of any premises, to place, or permit to be
placed, upon the half of the sidewalk of the half of
the street next to such premises:
"l. Any broken ware, glass, filth, rubbish, refuse matters, ice, water, mud, garbage, ashes, tin
cans or other like substances.
"2. Any vehicle, lumber, wood, boxes, fencing
building material, dead trees, tree stumps, merchanchse or other thing \vhich shall obstruct such
public street or sidewalk or any part thereof, or the
fret< use and enjoyment thereof, the free passage
over and upon the same, or any part thereof, without the permission of the City Council."
Certainly the cement blocks come under the all-inclusi1 e item, "or other thing". Certainly the duty is placed
li(it only upon the property owner, but upon the occupant
as well, or anyone else having control.
Tlw State Supreme Court has taken the attitude in
llw past that after a city has been liable on an obstruction of this nature, under circumstances where a build:w is under control of an occupant or a tenant, the city
inay collect its damages from the person having control
J
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of same, in the case of Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, 159
P. 2d 149, 108 Utah 266. This was a situation in which a
person had been injured by catching a heel in a grating
that was normally in the sidewalk for the purpose of
covering a hole for putting merchandise into the basement of a building. The Schubach defendants were tenants of a portion of the building only, but apparently
had control of this particular obstruction. The individual that was injured had collected from Salt Lake City.
In this particular instance, the Supreme Court of Utah
upheld a judgment against the tenant Schubach for
maintaining this obstruction, with the statement that
anyone who obstructs a sidewalk in such a manner that
it is not for the benefit of the city or any other individual, must do so in such a manner that he incommodes
the public as little as possible, with the further provision that he shall excavate and install such structures
on the condition that he "shall use more than ordinary
care." In addition, the court holds,
"This duty is a continuing one, appurtenant as
it were to the land, and liability for failure in duty
cannot be delegated, nor can it be terminated except by transfer of the land or surrender of the privilege of maintaining the structure."
In the case at hand, the lease transfers the duty of
maintaining the structure, but certainly under this case
of Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, it carries with it the ad·
ditional duty of maintenance of the adjoining sidewalk
and street premises. Also, in the case at hand, we have
not only a question of negligence in maintaining the
structure, but gross negligence in removing a portion of
the structure and leaving an item that should have
been removed at the time the structure was removed.
In the Schubach case there is no end of authority hold·
ing similar conclusions. In the Schubach case, the city
had paid a judgment to one Sabey, the person who had
been injured, and the issue was whether or not it could
be recovered from the owner of the abutting property
or the tenant. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah
allowed recovery from the tenant in this particular in·
stance, intimating that it \Vas based upon the exclusive
use and control of the item that caused the damage, and
indicating that had the use and control not been passed
on in a manrier by agreement and practice, the proper·
ty owner would have been liable. However, the court also
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111<1dc a finding that if the defects causing the injury ex-

,,.tLd at the time of making the lease, the owner does
not thereby escape liability, but simply allowed the
liability to be passed on through the owner to the tenant because of the nature of the use and control.
Many cases hold that violation of a law or ordinance
1s negligence in itself and there is no question that an
orclinanCl' of Kanab City was violated by all defendants
(''.Cept Kanab City and that Kanab City tolerated the
1 ioiation. In Skerl vs. Willow Creek Coal Co., 69 P.2d
302, 92 Utah 474, this was set out and has been amplified by many other cases. In the Skerl vs. Willow Creek
Coal Company case there are quoted several other cases
as foilows: "When a standard of duty or care is fixed
by lavv or ordinance, and such law or ordinance has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as
a mattH of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence."
In this Kanab case we have the ordinance and the
1 iPiation and the condonation of the violation. Of course,
the defendants will claim that the ordinance was not
pz1c;sed for the benefit of the plaintiff. However, this is
not true. For what reason would such an ordinance be
passed except to make the streets safe for everyone who
used them, including the plaintiff?
Also, see the recent case of Klafta vs. Smith, 404
P.2d 659, 17 Utah 2d 65, in which a similar situation was
ruled negligence as a matter of law and the only issue
1.o be tried was damage and the action of the trial court
in so ruling was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.

Point II
EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PERFORM SAID DUTY AND THIS WAS NEGLIGENCE
ON THE PART OF EACH OF SAID DEFENDANTS.
It goes without saying that it is admitted by all par-

ties that at the time of the accident, the blocks were still
in the position that they had been in when Mr. Bybee
had removed the canopy at the request of the City and
1lw State Road.
Also, plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, which
show,, as having been received in evidence on Page 14
(;I the transcript, was admitted without objection by any
ilt>k11d::mt, and was identified as a picture taken a few
da.\ :-: ,irter the 16th of September, 1963, and on Page 13,
I.me 12 of the transcript is identified as correctly repre-
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senting the area that he was photographing at the time
the picture was taken, and that it was taken shortly af.
ter the 16th of September, 1963, in front of the California-Pacific Utilities office. There is no question as to
the representations of the photograph being correct.
Under these conditions, there can be no argument as to
the existence of the hazard at the time of the accident.
Point III
PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED AS A DIRECT AND
PROXIMATE RESULT OF FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS TO PERFORM SAID DUTY.
There can be no question that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the fall in the area on the 16th day of
September, 1963. By the time the claim was filed with
Kanab City, which was 3 October, 1963, plaintiff had
been back to the area and concluded that she had fallen
over the cement block or the pipe, and the claim so
states. There is also no question that at the time of the
fall, plaintiff did not know what she fell over, but made
a determination at a later date as to the cause of her
fall, and as to leaving the car and closing the door, her
testimony is to the effect that her back was turned, and
that she turned and fell as she started toward the bank,
which would have been in a diagonal direction from the
car. In cross-examination, the plaintiff very definitely
stated that she did not know what she fell over, and has
never made any other statement at anytime, including
depositions and any other item. Under these conditions,
the claim to Kanab City, which was offered in evidence
as an exhibit by the defendants and which was admitted
in evidence by the plaintiff, regardless of the notes of
the transcript, and which was received in evidence, one
must conclude that she determined after the fall, the
item that caused her to fall. After all, the lady was un·
conscious and was in the hospital for several days.
This raises the question as to whether or not a per·
son can go back to a scene after several days and determine what he fell on, and then claim damages as a re·
sult of same when he did not know what he fell on at the
time. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in
several instances indicated not only that a person can
go back and determine what he fell on, but that a rea·
sonable assumption of what caused damage can be col·
lected upon.
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A most interesting case has recently been decided
in this field by the Utah State Supreme Court, and which
rnay come before the State Supreme Court again. This
is the case of Spencer vs. Salt Lake City, 412 P. 2d 449,
17 Utah 2d, 362, in which a claim against Salt Lake City
was thrown out by a trial judge on a city's motion to
dismiss claim because the claim that had been presented to the city was insufficient by its failure to state the
amount of damage which was claimed. The action of
the trial judge was reversed by the State Supreme Court
on March 18, 1966, holding that the only thing the claim
lacked was the amount of damages claimed, and that
since the city was given the essential facts which would
enable it to make a proper investigation, the claim was
satisfactory. This case was later tried before a jury in
Salt Lake County and during the early summer of 1966,
a Salt Lake County jury awarded damages in the amount
of $29,347.78. In the jury trial of this item, a special form
of verdict was submitted as follows:
"Question No. 1. Did Frances Spencer trip over a
defect in the sidewalk. Answer - Yes.
"Question No. 2. If she did, was she negligent in not
seeing the defect? Answer - No.
"Question No. 3. If so, was the negligence a principal cause of the injury to her? Answer - Not answered.
"Question No. 4. If it was not or she was not negligent, what amount of money would fairly and adequately recompense Frances Spencer for any and
all injuries and damages she sustained as a result
of her tripping over the defect in the sidewalk. Answer - $29,437.78."
During the trial of this particular matter, it developed that Frances Spencer did not know what she had
fallen on at the time she fell, and went back to the same
place at a later date and determined that she had fallen
over a defect in the sidewalk. Of special significance is
the case of Hunt vs. Tooele City preciously cited as
TH P. 2d 555. 8 Utah 323. In this particular matter, in
a dissenting opinion, Justice Henroid quotes a cross-examination to the effect that at the time the lady fell,
~ht• was watching, but she didn't see the hole that she
Put her foot in, and that after she had fallen she looked
back and determined what had tripped her, and in this
particular instance, the Supreme Court of the State of
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Utah, with one dissent, endorsed the damages that were
paid. In the Utah Report of the Hunt vs. Tooele City case
011 page 327 in 17 Utah 2d, there is a picture of the ho!~
in Tooele City that Mrs. Hunt stepped in. A comparison
of the two photographs, to-wit, the Hunt vs. Tooele City
photograph, and the photograph of the cement blocks
in the case now at hand, same being Exhibit "l", shows
that if hazards can be comparative, the hazard in Kanab
was rnuch greater. Also, in the Supreme Court Reports,
on Tom vs. Days of '47, Inc, 401, P __ 2d 946, 16 Utah 2d
386, there is not even a definite finding as to what caused
the plaintiff, Frank Biil Tom, to fall off the grandstand.
He had been a participant in a rodeo and went to participate but got there too late, and they let him and his
wife and children in for nothing. Mr. Tom and two teen
age sons took seats in the top row of the bleacher section. The wife and the younger children were two or
three ro\vs below them. During the performance a
Brahma bull broke through a fence that was later determined to be unsatisfactory under the use to which
it was being put, and charged into the crowd, and Mr.
Tom was found injured at the bottom of the area he
had been sitting on:
"Although there was no direct evidence as to
what caused plaintiff to fall, there was evidence
that when the bull charged, the crowd stampeded;
that plaintiff was not drunk at the time! that he
was seated on top of the bleachers; that the top of
the bleacers had no back support; that plaintiff was
found lying unconscious on the ground, his head
evidently having struck concrete. The circumstances
outlined above were sufficient from which the jury
could reasonably conclude and find the plaintiff's
fall \Vas caused by the si...trge of the frightened
crowd as il t~"ied to escape when the bull charged
the fence."
When I compare this statement with the admitted
fact situation of lVfrs. McAllister returning to the scene
and determining that she had fallen over these cement
blocks or pipe, and the Hunt vs. Tooele City, and the
Spencer v~. Salt Lake City cases, there is no question
that the maUc1· should kwe been submitted to a jury,
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and lhat if a jury had found for the plaintiff, they would
]lave been justified in doing so.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING CASE
FROM THE JURY.
This case was taken from the jury by the trial court
at the end of plaintiff's case without evidence being offered by the defendants. The question of contributory
rvidence was not considered by the court, and had it
been, the cases are legion that this is a question for the
jury to consider. The language of the judgment Dismissal is, " ... upon the ground that on the facts presented
by plaintiff, and the law applicable thereto, plaintiff
had shown no right to relief as against any of the defendants ... ". Under these conditions, and in the light
of the cases quoted above, and in view of the court's
duty to take the plaintiff's uncontested evidence, and
give it the strongest possible import, there is no question that there was sufficient evidence presented to go
to the jury on the question of proximate cause and damages. Under these conditions, the court very definitely
should have put the defendants on their proof and allowed the case to go to the jury.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the plaintiff-appellant claims that the
trial court has erred and shown bias and prejudice in
dismissing the case under the circumstances, inasmuch
as giving the strongest possible construction to the
plaintiff's testimony, in view of the cases that have been
cited above, there was more than sufficient evidence to
go to a jury, and a great deal more evidence than in
many of the cases that have been upheld by the Utah
:c;upreme Court in judgments for plaintiffs; and that the
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a new trial. This is especially true
11 hen we consider that we allow people to be convicted
of criminal acts on the basis of circumstantial evidence;
when we consider that we have allowed the collection
hy Frank Bill Tom, where no one knows how he got
pushed off the bleachers - whether the crowd did it or
whether he went to sleep and fell off, and when we consider that in both the case of Spencer vs. Salt lake City
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and Hunt vs. Tooele City, they were similar types of actions against a city for defective sidewalk and curb
conditions, and that in each case after the injury the
plaintiff ascertained what caused the fall.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick H. Fenton,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

